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CALIFORNIA'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
The Honorable Billy G. Mills*
Mary Lyons McNamar**
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence has existed since the beginning of fam-
ily life.1 It occurs between husbands and wives, parents and
children in the traditional family. The concept of family, orig-
inally based on a married couple and their children, has now
expanded to include people in nonmarital relationships, group
families and families consisting of persons of the same sex.
These non-traditional families also experience domestic
violence.2
This article provides factual information on domestic vio-
lence and will examine past legal and judicial efforts to deal
with violence in the California home. The article analyzes
Chapter 795 of Senate Bill 93 that includes the Domestic Vio-
lence Prevention Act (DVPA) and related statutes which went
into effect on July 1, 1980. Appendix A provides a simplified
guide to using the new legislation. Although domestic violence
is a nationwide concern, the emphasis here will be on Califor-
nia laws and remedies.
The terms used in this article and throughout the new
legislation are defined in section 542 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure.4
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1. Gil, Societal Violence and Violence in Families, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 14, 17
(J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978).
2. Strauss, Wife Beating: Causes, Treatment, and Research Needs, in U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTs, BATrEED WOMEN: Issuns OF PUBLIC POLCY 468 (1978).
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(a) "[albuse" means intentionally or recklessly
causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing
another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury to himself or another;
(b) "[d]omestic violence" is abuse perpetrated
against a family or household member;6
(c) "[flamily or household member" means spouse,
former spouse, parent, child, any other person related by
consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household and
has sexual relations with another family or household
member residing in the household, or who within the last
six months regularly resided in the household during
which time he or she had sexual relations with another
family or household member presently residing in the
household.7
It is this expanded definitional concept of family or household
member which provides the most novel aspect of the new law.
Domestic violence, and the inability of law enforcement
agencies to deal with the problem, was brought to the atten-
tion of Californians in 1978 when the Attorney General con-
ducted two statewide conferences that highlighted the concern
felt throughout the state.' The statistics examined at the con-
ference revealed a problem of considerable magnitude. It was
estimated on the basis of existing reports and information
from federal, state and local government agencies that there is
some form of domestic violence in twenty-five percent of all
families in this country.10 Based on national statistics, it can
be inferred that fifty percent of married women in California
will be assaulted by their husbands at some time during the
relationship."
Statistics also show a correlation between wife-beating
and wife-murder.12 In California, between 1976 and 1978, 4.3
percent of male homicide victims were murdered by their
5. Id. § 542(a).
6. Id. § 542(b).
7. Id. 542(c).
8. See CALWORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION PAMPHLET No. 11,
HANDBOOK ON DosmzsTc VIOLENCE (3d rev. ed.) (1978).
9. Id. at 2-4.
10. Id. at 2.
11. R. LANGLEY & R. Lm, WIn BEATIN: THE SnEr CIsIs 19 (1977).




wives and 18.5 percent of female homicide victims were mur-
dered by their husbands.13 In 1978, fifty-six percent of the
murder victims were acquainted with their assailants and one
out of every five victims was related to the offender.
14
Domestic violence exists in all socio-economic classes and
ethnic groups. 15 However, greater numbers of lower income
victims are reflected in law enforcement data because middle-
class victims are more apt to consult a physician or attorney
rather than the police.1" Nevertheless, when private attorneys
are polled they report an incidence of middle-class domestic
violence which correlates with legal aid findings of violence
among the indigent.17
Harm is not limited to family members; domestic violence
endangers law enforcement officers who are called to inter-
vene. Nationwide eleven percent of the officers killed in action
were killed while answering a call involving domestic vio-
lence. 3 Also, thirty percent of officers in the United States
injured in action were injured while answering "disturbance"
calls.1 '
The victims are not only those directly injured but all
members of the family involved.'0 "A man who beats his wife
is injuring not only her but also their children, and injuring
them, perhaps permanently, in their attitudes towards other
human beings. Domestic violence destroys the family and the
family is the basis of our whole society.' 1  Studies indicate
that domestic violence is learned behavior and children from
violent homes are apt to repeat this behavior in their homes
13. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 52 (1978).
14. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 FBI UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS].
15. Stark & McEvoy, Middle-Class Violence, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1970, at
52-53.
16. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 914, 915.
17. Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L. REV.
259, 271 (1971).
18. 1978 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 14, at 307.
19. Disturbance is defined as "family quarrels, man-with-gun calls, bar fights,
etc." Id. at 301.
20. Strauss, Wife-Beating: How Common and Why, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 34 (J.
Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1978).
21. Domestic Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary,
California Legislature, (Oct. 25, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Domestic
Violence] (statement of Senator Jerry Smith).
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as adults."' Therefore, enactment of Senate Bill 9, Which givesincreased attention to domestic violence in California, comes
none too soon.
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF PAST LEGISLATION
California previously dealt with domestic violence both
criminally and civilly. While this article deals primarily with
civil procedures, existing criminal sanctions will be briefly
mentioned.
A. Criminal Statutes
Criminal statutes which may apply are: assault and bat-
tery;2 8 assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce
great bodily injury;24 assault with intent to commit murder;'3
mayhem;2 6 assault with intent to commit mayhem; 7 posses-
sion of a deadly weapon with intent to assault;28 murder andjustifiable homicide;"9 corporal injury;80 disturbing the peace;8
criminal contempt;3 ' felony child stealing;8" and child abuse.'
A violation of these criminal statutes in the home can behandled by either a police or citizen arrest. The police have
authority to make an arrest if they have reasonable cause to
believe a felony has been committed or if they witness the
commission of a misdemeanor. If the police refuse or they lack
evidence to make an arrest, the victim can make a citizen's
arrest. Every citizen has the right to arrest a person who com-
mits a crime in his or her presence.3 5 Pragmatically, the citi-
zen's arrest is not an effective alternative for the victim of do-
mestic violence, both because of the danger involved to the
22. GeUes, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38 J. MARR. & FAM. 659, 662(1976).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 240, 242 (West 1970).
24. Id. § 245 (West Supp. 1979).
25. Id. § 217.
26. Id. § 203 (West 1970).
27. Id. § 220 (West Supp. 1979).
28. Id. § 467 (West 1970).
29. Id. §§ 187 (West Supp. 1979), 198, 199 (West 1970).
30. Id. § 273.5 (West Supp. 1979).
31. Id. § 415.
32. Id. § 166 (West 1970).
33. Id. §§ 278.5 (West Supp. 1979).
34. Id. § 273(a), (d) (West Supp. 1980).
35. Id. §§ 834, 837 (West 1970).
[Vol. 21
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
victim 6 and because most people aren't aware of the option.
The civil remedies available to victims of domestic vio-
lence are assault and battery compensation, dissolution, legal
separation or nullity if married, and protective orders. The
emphasis in this article and in the new legislation is primarily
on protective orders.
B. Civil Statutes
Until July 1, 1980 there were three types of civil tempo-
rary restraining orders available in domestic violence cases.
They were Family Law Act (FLA) orders, harassment orders,
and several orders under section 527 of the Civil Code. If a
temporary restraining order was violated, civil contempt pro-
cedures could be used to enforce the restraining order.87 Un-
fortunately, "enforcement of protective orders has been gener-
ally non-existent."" The ineffectiveness of the existing
restraining orders was analyzed in the Attorney General's con-
ferences and hearings. Several reasons were found for the fail-
ure of temporary restraining orders (TRO's) to provide pro-
tection for the battered person. A brief analysis of each pre-
Senate Bill 9 restraining order and its weaknesses follows.
The first category of TRO's was authorized in section
4359 of the Civil Code," a part of the Family Law Act of
1970.40 The statute provided a variety of protective orders for
a narrow group of domestic violence victims consisting of mar-
ried couples who had filed for dissolution, legal separation or
nullity. The subsection restraining physical conduct enjoined
"any party from molesting or disturbing the peace .''4 This
wording was found to be too vague.4 Even when a temporary
restraining order was obtained, batterers often failed to un-
derstand the meaning of the order, and violated it. Law en-
forcement officials complained that the language was non-spe-
36. Hearings on Domestic Violence, supra note 21, at 130 (statement of Carol
Corrigan).
37. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1209 (West Supp. 1979).
38. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON FAMILY LAW TO THE SENATE SuBcoMMITr ON AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (October 23, 1978) (hereinafter cited as
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] (available from the Senate Rules Committee of the California
State Legislature, Sacramento, California).
39. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359 (West Supp. 1979).
40. Id. §§ 4000-5100 (West 1979).
41. Id. § 4359(2).
42. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 38, at 11.
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cific and caused difficulty in determining whether a violation
had occurred."
The attitudes of law enforcement officers also encouraged
violations of TRO's. Traditionally, California police officers
were trained in crisis intervention with the goal of keeping do-
mestic violence out of the criminal justice system."' Domestic
violence was considered a civil problem. Law enforcement
agents were also aware that many cases would not go to trial
even if an arrest were made because complainants often did
not prosecute. Furthermore, one study in San Francisco in
1978 found only thirteen percent of serious felony beatings re-
sulted in guilty findings even when prosecuted." These fac-
tors, combined with the personal danger involved, made most
law enforcement officers less than zealous in their response to
domestic violence calls.
The policy of noninvolvement existed partially because
section 4359 of the Civil Code provided no authority to file a
TRO with local law enforcement agencies. Thus, police gener-
ally referred victims who possessed a TRO to their attorney.4"
In the event the marriage dissolved, the orders could not be
included in final judgments, even though the need for protec-
tion was as necessary after separation as it was during the
marriage. The final drawback to section 4359 was that it ap-
plied only where a Family Law Act action of dissolution, nul-
lity, or separation had been initiated. There was no protective
remedy for those in a nonmarital relationship or for the mar-
ried couple who wished to stay together and try to resolve
their differences.
Protection from domestic violence by obtaining re-
straining orders was expanded with the passage of section
527(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure47 in 1977. This statute
applied to a nonmarital relationship or to a married couple
who wished to work out their differences without filing for dis-
solution, separation, or nullity. The protective order was is-
sued on a showing of "actual violence resulting in physical in-
43. Id.
44. Hearings on Domestic Violence, supra note 21, at 111 (statement of Clem-
ent DeAmicis).
45. Id. at 113.
46. Domasinc VIOLENCE, supra note 38, at 16.
47. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 527(b) (West 1980).
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jury.48 In practice, however, section 527(b) had several
failings:4" 1) It contained no provision to recover attorney's
fees and costs (approximately $200-$400) if an attorney was
used, and the filing was difficult for some people without the
help of an attorney; 2) the section 527(b) order provided only
30 days protection; 3) there was some confusion about the
scope of its applicability because section 527(b) didn't clearly
define the specific behaviors which could be restrained.50
The third pre-Senate Bill 9 restraining order provided
protection against harassment. A restraining order under sec-
tion 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be obtained
against a stranger as no personal relationship between the
parties was required. With two additions, this order remains
the same after Senate Bill 9. The new legislation provides a
mechanism for registering the TRO with the police and a pro-
vision is added that allows a section 527.6 order only if the
parties are not covered by the FLA,51 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), 2 or the DVPA. 53
These early protective orders were a beginning but due to
their various limitations and disadvantages, thousands of vic-
tims were still denied protection." It was a concern for these
victims that led the Attorney General to invite multidiscipline
experts together to consider the problem. The data gathered
and the information exchanged during the state-wide Confer-
ence on Domestic Violence in 1978 led to the establishment of
the Study Group on Domestic Violence. The group's findings
and recommendations were reviewed in legislative hearings
held by Senator Jerry Smith, Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Judiciary, who sponsored Senate Bill 9.55
III. DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT
Senate Bill 9 consists of the "Domestic Violence Preven-
tion Act"" and related amendments and additions. All
48. Id.
49. See Domwsc VIoLmscE, eupra note 38, at 14.
50. Id. at 15. Section 527(b) authorized a restraining order and a period of sepa-
ration of the parties. Different courts interpreted this a variety of ways.
51. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4000-5100 (West 1979).
52. CAL. Civ. CODE 55 7000-7020 (West Supp. 1979).
53. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 540-553 (West Supp. 1980).
54. DoMESnc VIOLENCE, supra note 38, at 17.
55. Id.
56. CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE §§ 540-553 (West Supp. 1980).
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changes are under one bill which is helpful in interpreting am-
biguous sections as it may indicate a legislative intent that
they be construed together.6 7 Substantively and procedurally,
the ability to secure protective orders in a variety of situations
has been greatly expanded.
To understand the legislation it is useful to examine the
kinds of relief offered. Senate Bill 9 contains a number of
variables that are best organized by categorizing the relation-
ship of the parties. Once that is determined the possible reme-
dies depend on whether the orders are ex parte or noticed and
the type of relief sought.
Briefly, the types of relations covered under the new law
are:
1) Family Law Act marriage relationships-a relationship
in which a dissolution, legal separation, or nullity action has
been initiated.
2) Domestic Violence Prevention Act family or household
relationships 5S-members of this group can obtain a protec-
tive order if, prior to or at the time the order is granted, they
are residing with the person to whom the order is directed.
This category includes marital or nonmarital relationships.
3) Uniform Parentage Act parents of a child-no continu-
ing relationship is necessary as long as a child resulted from a
past union. The party entitled to relief is the one who has
care, custody, and control of the minor child. 9
4) No relationship other than the harassment complained
of-the party entitled to relief is any person who is the sub-
ject of "harassment," providing no action is on file or could be
filed under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, the Uni-
form Parentage Act, or the Family Law Act. This is the re-
vised section 527.6 harassment order.
A. Overview
After the relationship between the parties is determined,
the applicable statutes must be examined. In the following
section the statutes which are amended by the Domestic Vio-
57. The Rutter Group, New Tools for the Family Lawyer: Protective Orders
Under Domestic Violence Prevention Legislation 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Pro-
tective Orders].
58. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
59. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 7020(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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lence Prevention Act as contained in Senate Bill 9 are briefly
mentioned to provide an overview and are then analyzed in
depth.
The amendments and additions to the FLA under the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act are found in section 4359
of the Civil Code (ex parte protective orders) which is ex-
panded to provide for new orders, new procedures, and new
enforcement measures. 0 Sections 4458 and 4516 of the Civil
Code are added to authorize inclusions of restraining orders in
final judgments and enforcement of such orders. Section 5102
of the Civil Code is amended to extend the availability of
"move out" orders to spouses when harm would result to
them or persons under their care, custody, or control and the
family dwelling happens to be the separate property of one of
the spouses.
Additions to the Uniform Parentage Act are found in sec-
tion 7020 of the Civil Code,61 authorizing certain FLA re-
straining orders during pendency of paternity actions, and
section 7021 of the Civil Code, authorizing inclusion of the or-
ders in a judgment entered under the Uniform Parentage Act.
The purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act is
to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence by a spouse
or household member against another spouse or other
family or household members and to provide for a separa-
tion of the persons involved in such domestic violence for
a period of time sufficient to enable such persons to seek
resolution of the causes of the violence.62
The DVPA remedies are in addition to other civil or criminal
remedies already available. The amendments which establish
the injunctive relief procedure are, first, section 527(a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure which is amended to sanction ex
parte issuance of TRO's under the Uniform Parentage Act
(section 7020 of the Civil Code) and the DVPA (section 546 of
the Code of Civil Procedure). Second, the former section
527(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure was totally repealed and
replaced with the DVPA. The new section 527(b) authorizes
reissuance of DVPA ex parte TRO's if a defendant could not
be served on time. Third, section 529 of the Code of Civil Pro-
60. See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
61. See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
62. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 540 (West Supp. 1980).
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cedure is amended to relax bond requirements for injunctive
relief.
Harassment orders (section 527.6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure) are amended to require the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff's attorney to deliver the order to the court clerk the day it
is issued and requires the court clerk to forward the order
that day to the law enforcement agencies. The statute cannot
be applied if relief is otherwise possible under the DVPA, the
FLA, or the UPA.
Two other code sections should be noted. Section 273.6 of
the Penal Code is added to make certain violations misde-
meanors and Section 1377 of the Penal Code is amended to
prohibit civil compromise of section 273.6 charges, a common
occurrence in the past. 8 Section 26833.5 of the Government
Code provides indigent plaintiffs free certified copies of the
various TRO's that are to be registered with various law en-
forcement agencies."
Confronted with this variety of new and changed laws,
how does a practicing attorney locate the proper statutes
under Senate Bill 9 and correctly use them? The first step is
to examine the relationship between the parties.
B. Analysis of Family Law Act Legislation
1. Ex parte orders. If the couple is married and has ini-
tiated a proceeding for dissolution, legal separation or nullity,
then FLA orders are available. If the proceeding is ex parte,
the orders available consist of property restraint, restraint on
personal conduct, dwelling exclusion, custody and visitation,
property use, and restraint on "other" conduct. Changes of
note under restraint on personal conduct include the expan-
sion of the earlier terminology of "molesting" and "disturbing
the peace" to include a variety of named specific behaviors.
Third party protection is expanded to "family and household
members." Changes in the dwelling exclusion" make it imma-
terial who has superior title or right to possession; the appli-
cant spouse, however, must now show assaultive or threatened
assaultive conduct as well as a likelihood of physical or emo-
63. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273.6, 1377 (West Supp. 1979).
64. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 26833.5 (West Supp. 1979).
65. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
66. Id. §§ 4359(a)(3), 5102.
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tional harm. The custody and visitation sectione7 for the first
time expressly authorizes ex parte visitation orders. Restraint
on other conduct 8 is non-specific authority to enjoin behavior
effecting either personal conduct or "move out" orders. Pre-
sumably its usage will become commonplace as a basis for re-
sponding to unique situations not otherwise covered by the
statutes.6 9
2. Noticed Motions. As before, the usual orders for sup-
port, custody, attorney's fees, payment of preexisting debts
and the like are available pendente lite upon a noticed hear-
ing under either the Notice of Motion or the Order to Show
Cause procedure. In addition, under the DVPA, all the above
discussed ex parte orders can also be issued upon notice and
hearing.
In addition to ex parte and noticed orders, protective or-
ders under the FLA can be included in interlocutory judg-
ments and judgments to prohibit abusive personal conduct
and other specific behaviors which effect abusive personal
conduct. 70
C. Analysis of Domestic Violence Prevention Act
Legislation.
1. Ex parte orders. If there is no FLA proceeding pend-
ing, parties can obtain protective orders under the DVPA.
Spouses can obtain any of the ex parte orders available under
FLA. If the relationship is nonmarital, four of the six FLA
orders can be issued ex parte. The four are: enjoining personal
conduct, excluding one party from the home (if plaintiff can
establish "right under color of law" to possession of the prem-
ises), 71 enjoining other specified behavior, and determining
the temporary custody of a minor child of plaintiff and
defendant.
2. Noticed Motions. Upon notice and hearing a variety
of restraining orders can be issued under the DVPA. If the
parties are married, any of the FLA ex parte orders are availa-
ble through a noticed motion procedure. In the case of a
67. Id. § 4359(a)(4).
68. Id. § 4359(a)(6).
69. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 4.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4516 (West Supp. 1979).
71. CAL. CIv. PROC. Coma § 546 (West Supp. 1980).
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nonmarital relationship, orders enjoining personal conduct,
temporary use of property, and other specified behavior are
available. Exclusion from residence orders are also available.
Where the motion for such an order is made on a noticed
hearing there is no requirement of title and right to posses-
sion. Temporary custody of a minor child of plaintiff and de-
fendant can also be determined in a noticed hearing but not
temporary visitation orders. 2
In addition, under the DVPA where the parties are in ei-
ther a marital or nonmarital relationship, the court can issue a
variety of remedial orders with noticed hearing. They are or-
ders for restitution to the applicant for costs incurred as a di-
rect result of "abuse,' 7 restitution to defendant for expenses
incurred because of an order issued upon insufficient facts,7
orders requiring any party to participate in counseling, 5 child
support orders if the child is in plaintiff's custody and defen-
dant is the presumed natural father under section 7004 of the
Civil Code 7 and lastly, orders for payment of attorney's fees
and costs to the prevailing party.
D. Analysis of Uniform Parentage Act Legislation
1. Ex parte orders. If the relationship between the par-
ties produced a child, proceedings can take place under the
UPA. 78 This legislation does not require the parties to live to-
gether or to have any kind of continuing relationship.
Ex parte orders under the UPA restrain personal conduct
exactly like the FLA restraining orders except that the protec-
tion is limited to the plaintiff and minor child.7' It is also pos-
sible to get an order excluding the defendant from the dwell-
ing of the party who has care, custody, and control of the
minor child where there is threatened harm or abuse to minor
or plaintiff.80 Like the FLA and the DVPA, the UPA enjoins
any other specified behavior where necessary to limit personal
72. Id. § 547(a).
73. Id. § 547(c).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 547(d).
76. Id. § 547(b).
77. Id. § 547(e).
78. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 7000, 7020 (West Supp. 1979).
79. Id. § 7020(a)(1).
80. Id. § 7020(a)(2).
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conduct or effectuate move out orders.81
2. Noticed Motions. Upon notice and a hearing any of
the above ex parte UPA orders are available. 8' And, of course,
there is nothing to prevent the commencement of DVPA pro-
ceedings to obtain those noticed hearing remedies available to
unmarried persons if the parents reside in the same
household.8
E. Analysis of Harassment Legislation
The last category of protective orders under Senate Bill 9
applies to the victim who has no redress under the FLA, the
DVPA, or the UPA. An example might be a neighbor, or a girl
friend or family member who is not a household member.
Both ex parte and noticed hearing orders are available en-
joining any "knowing and willful course of conduct directed at
a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys or harasses
such person, and which serves no legitimate purpose," pro-
vided the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person
to suffer substantive emotional distress, and actually does
cause plaintiff such distress."
F. Procedural Limitations in Senate Bill 9
Timeliness is the first limitation. Ex parte orders under
the FLA, the DVPA, or the UPA must be made returnable for
an order to show cause hearing on the earliest day possible
but not later than fifteen days or with good cause, twenty
days.88 Ex parte TRO's against harassment can remain in ef-
fect up to fifteen days but a hearing must be held within
fifteen days of filing the petition for injunction." Under gen-
eral law, a defendant is entitled to one continuance as a mat-
ter of right. The one exception is a FLA proceeding where the
court can require an immediate hearing "in the interest of jus-
tice" without allowing a continuance.8 7 Another exception to
the twenty day maximum is the reissuance of DVPA orders
81. Id. § 7020(a)(3).
82. Id. § 7020(b).
83. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 7.
84. CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE § 527.6(b) (West Supp. 1980).
85. Id. §§ 527(a), 546; CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 4359(a), 7020(a) (West Supp. 1979).
86. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 527.6(c), (d) (West Supp. 1979).
87. CAL. Rmuz CT. 1225(a).
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where the plaintiff established by affidavit that the defendant
could not be served in time. No fees are to be charged unless
the order has been issued three times previously.88
If a TRO is issued after a noticed hearing under the
DVPA or the UPA they will normally remain in effect for a
maximum of ninety days. The orders can be extended by mu-
tual consent of the parties for up to one year. The court can
also limit or extend the ninety day effective period." Injunc-
tions against harassment following notice and hearing can re-
main in effect up to three years and are renewable.90 Re-
straining orders incorporated into a FLA or UPA judgment
under sections 4458, 4516, or 7021 of the Civil Code can re-
main in effect up to one year from the date of entry of the
judgment unless extended by the court after notice and
hearing."1
A second procedural limitation on the Senate Bill 9 pro-
tective orders is the notice date required on the orders. Any
order issued under the FLA, the UPA, or the DVPA must now
state the date of expiration on its face. The same is true of
reissued DVPA orders."'
Another change is the relaxation of bond requirements.
Ordinarily the party who obtains a preliminary injunction
must assure payment of damages if the court later determines
that the injunction should not have issued.' 3 The new legisla-
tion eliminates the bond requirement for obtaining restraining
orders in legal separation or dissolution proceedings, DVPA
proceedings, or UPA proceedings.
A last procedural requirement of Senate Bill 9 is that all
FLA, DVPA, or harassment proceeding motions must be sub-
mitted on the prescribed Judicial Council forms."
88. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527(b) (West Supp. 1979).
89. Id. § 548; CAL. CIv. CODE § 7020(b) (West Supp. 1979).
90. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.6(d) (West Supp. 1980).
91. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4458, 4516, 7021 (West Supp. 1979).
92. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 527(b), 552 (West Supp. 1980), CAL. CIv. CODE §§
4359(a), 4458, 4516, 7020(c), 7021 (West Supp. 1979).
93. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 11.
94. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.6(k) (West Supp. 1980). No provision for
mandatory forms was incorporated into the UPA. The new forms, however, have been
drafted to encompass UPA proceedings. The new forms can be found in WEST'S CALI-
FORNIA CODE FORMS, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 527.6 (2d ed. Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 21
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
G. Registration and Enforcement of TRO's Under Senate
Bill 9
The new legislation clarifies the procedure for registration
and enforcement of TRO's. The registration procedure is now
mandatory, both on the part of the prevailing party or his or
her attorney and the court clerk. Orders issued under the
DVPA, the FLA, or the UPA or the modification, extension,
or termination of such orders must be delivered by the appli-
cant party or his or her attorney and mailed by the clerk at
the close of the business day on which the order is granted.
The restraining order can be mailed to law enforcement agen-
cies near the complainant's residence, place of employment,
his or her children's school, or other places where violence is
likely to occur.9 5 A similar mailing requirement applies to har-
assment orders, but the order need only be forwarded to such
law enforcement agencies "within the court's discretion as are
requested by the plaintiff.""
In addition, law enforcement agencies where DVPA, FLA,
or UPA orders are registered must maintain a verification sys-
tem and make available to officers responding to reports of
domestic violence the existence, terms, and current status of
the orders. 7 This verification duty is not, however, mandatory
for harassment orders. 8
The court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel or the
District Attorney to represent a plaintiff in enforcing a DVPA
order (whether issued ex parte, or on a noticed hearing") con-
cerning restraint of personal conduct, dwelling exclusion, or
restraint of specific conduct in connection with dwelling ex-
clusion. If counsel is appointed, attorney's fees and costs may
be assessed against the defendant.100
Criminal sanctions may be imposed for any willful or
knowing violation of three DVPA or FLA orders, whether is-
sued ex parte, upon noticed hearing, or at judgment. The
criminal sanctions apply to orders restraining personal con-
95. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 550; CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4359(b), 4458, 4516, 7020(d),
7021 (West Supp. 1979).
96. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.6(g) (West Supp. 1980).
97. Id. § 550; CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4359(b), 4458, 4516, 7020(d), 7021 (West Supp.
1979).
98. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 527.6(g) (West Supp. 1980).
99. Id. §§ 546, 547.
100. Id. § 553(a), (b).
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
duct, excluding one party from the home, or restraining other
specified behavior in connection with exclusion from the
home. Violation of the order is a misdemeanor, punishable by
up to six months imprisonment, or a maximum $500 fine, or
both.10 1 Identical sanctions are imposed for willful and know-
ing violations of UPA protective orders.1 02 Violations of har-
assment orders are punished as contempts. 10 8 Furthermore,
the misdemeanor offense cannot be compromised unless it is
the first Penal Code section 273.6 offense against the family or
household member.10 4
H. Ambiguous Areas of Senate Bill 9
As with any new legislation there are areas of Senate Bill
9 that appear ambiguous and will need clarification as the
laws are applied. The following is a brief summary of sections
that may prove troublesome.
1. Family Law Act. The FLA authorizes an ex parte or-
der for payment of any "liens or encumbrances coming due
during the pendency of the order."' 05 This subsection appears
to authorize ex parte orders for payment of money, however,
this may produce a constitutional due process problem if the
party ordered to pay has not yet appeared in the action or
otherwise become validly subject to the court's in personam
jurisdiction. While the order certainly binds the applicant-
party, it remains to be seen how the courts will respond to
requests for such orders against the other spouse.106
The amendments to the FLA mentions "family and
household members" but no definitions are given. 0 7 Since this
statute was passed at the same time as the DVPA, and both
are part of Senate Bill 9, the definitions contained in the
DVPA10 8 will probably apply.'09
Another problem under the FLA concerns sections 4458
and 4516 of the Civil Code which are identical statutes. Both
101. Id. § 551; CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp. 1979).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp. 1979).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(i) (West Supp. 1980); CAL. PENAL CODE § 166
(West 1970).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1377(4) (West Supp. 1979).
105. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4359(a)(5) (West Supp. 1979).
106. See Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 3.
107. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4359(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
108. See definitions in CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 542(e) (West Supp. 1979).
109. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 3.
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statutes authorize protective orders in final judgments. This
repetition appears to be an oversight on the part of the
drafter, believing that section 4458 referred only to judgments
of nullity and section 4516 was needed for disolution and legal
separation. Section 4458 refers to a "judgment entered pursu-
ant of this part"110 which is a reference to, and includes the
entire FLA, therefore, section 4516 is unnecessary as nullities
are already included in section 4458.
2. Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Under the DVPA
several statutes will need interpretation. Foremost is section
546 of the Civil Code (move out orders) which requires the
applicant to show "a right [to possession of the premises]
under color of law." ' This limitation applies in marital and
nonmarital situations when ex parte relief is sought under the
DVPA rather than the FLA. What constitutes a "right under
color of law" in nonmarital situations is not defined by the
act. Black's Law Dictionary defines "color of law" as "an ap-
pearance of legal right to possession." '' Perhaps a claim of
possession, supported by evidence of rent or trust deed pay-
ments, will qualify as "color of law."
The reissuance of DVPA orders is technically limited to
authorizing ex parte orders issued in DVPA proceedings.118
However, since the DVPA incorporates section 4359 of the
Civil Code and the amendments and additions were enacted
under one bill, it is arguable that TRO's issued in FLA pro-
ceedings should be capable of reissuance.1
1 4
DVPA orders must contain the following notice: "Notice:
These orders shall be enforced by all law enforcement officers
in the State of California."'115 This has not been incorporated
into the FLA or the UPA; however, since the statutes are so
similar the omission may have been a legislative oversight. It
would appear prudent to include the notice on all forms. " 6
Another probable legislative oversight appears in section 529
of the Civil Code which relaxes bond requirements for re-
straining orders in DVPA or UPA proceedings and in legal
110. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4458 (West Supp. 1980).
111. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 546 (West Supp. 1980).
112. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979).
113. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 526(b) (West Supp. 1980).
114. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 10.
115. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 552 (West Supp. 1980).
116. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 11.
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separation or dissolution proceedings but says nothing about
nullities. It seems doubtful that the omission was inten-
tional.117 Bonds were not required for harassment orders in
the past and are not required now.
A possible source of confusion exists in the forwarding of
orders to law enforcement agencies for registration. The stat-
utes require registration for "any" of the orders. However, not
all violations are punishable as misdemeanors. Thus, there is
some question whether the property-related orders must be
registered or only those orders subject to criminal penalties.
The Los Angeles Police Department takes the position that
enforcement by the police is limited to personal conduct,
dwelling exclusion, and enjoining specified behavior which the
court determines is necessary to effectuate personal conduct
or dwelling exclusion orders.11s Thus, there is no need to regis-
ter the other orders as they cannot be enforced under section
273.6.119
The DVPA provides for appointment of counsel or the
District Attorney to represent a plaintiff in enforcing DVPA
orders regarding personal conduct, dwelling exclusion and or-
ders restraining specific conduct.1 2 0 This is confusing as the
provision was not part of the FLA or the UPA. Since the pro-
tective orders issued under all of the Acts are substantially
the same, perhaps, by implication, appointed counsel is also
available under the FLA and the UPA. 111
A further ambiguity in the DVPA is found in the provi-
sions that, in effect, provide financial restitution for an inten-
tional tort by compensating the victim of domestic violence.12
This raises procedural questions since section 527 of the Civil
Code provides that hearings must be held within twenty days.
This probably does not provide enough time to muster the
medical testimony, damages, and defense necessary for a hear-
ing on the merits. Does the suit for damages then follow the
ordinary timing of civil trial procedures instead of the twenty
days mandated under section 527? If so, is this purely an inci-
117. Id.
118. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, Office of Operations (order effective
July 1, 1980, Los Angeles Police Department).
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp. 1979).
120. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 553(a) (West Supp. 1980).
121. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 13.
122. CAL. CIv. PRoc. COD § 547(c) (West Supp. 1980).
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dental damage provision to an equitable remedy or is a jury
trial necessary?'" These questions remain to be answered.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although certainly not a panacea for the social ills of do-
mestic violence, Senate Bill 9 is a starting point from which
California's victims of domestic violence can seek viable legal
methods for handling their problems. Through the use of re-
straining orders, the legislation provides all victims-not just
spouses or cohabitive persons---with some protection from do-
mestic violence. With the passage of Senate Bill 9 the law en-
forcement officer called to the scene of a domestic altercation
will now have specific procedures available to protect the
victim.
123. Protective Orders, supra note 57, at 6.
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